The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
Volume 22
Issue 1 Summer 2020

Article 3

July 2020

The Impact of Competition from Venture Capitalists on Corporate
Venturing Investment
Marco Bade
Technische Universität Berlin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Corporate Finance
Commons, Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons, and the Finance and Financial
Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Bade, Marco (2020) "The Impact of Competition from Venture Capitalists on Corporate Venturing
Investment," The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance: Vol. 22: Iss. 1.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.57229/2373-1761.1374
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol22/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graziadio School of Business and Management at
Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

The Impact of Competition from Venture Capitalists on Corporate Venturing
Investment
Cover Page Footnote
The author would like to thank the editor James C. Brau for handling the paper, and the anonymous
referee for his/her helpful feedback. The author also thanks Prof. Dr. Hans Hirth for valuable suggestions.

This article is available in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol22/
iss1/3

THE JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE VOLUME 22, NO. 1 (SUMMER 2020) 61-77

The Impact of Competition from Venture Capitalists
on Corporate Venturing Investment
Marco Bade
Technische Universität Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT
This study proposes a model on corporate venturing (CV) investment and examines the impact of venture
capital (VC) activity in the economy on CV firms’ investment. The presence of VCs creates competition
for entrepreneurs. This reduces CV firms’ expected venturing returns, and thus gives rise to a financial
disincentive to CV investment. The empirical prediction of this result is that competition for talent should
decrease CV investment. This prediction contradicts previous statements in the theoretical literature on
CV.
Keywords: Corporate venturing, Corporate venturing investment, Venture capital
JEL Codes: D86, G3, L26, M13

I.
Introduction
“In the past, corporate interest in creating venture funds tended to wax and wane
in sync with the general VC climate” (Lerner 2013, p. 88). Corporate venturing1 (CV)
and venture capital (VC) activity went hand in hand through cyclical boom phases in the
late 1960s, mid-1980s, and late 1990s (Bettignies and Chemla 2008, Dushnitsky 2011,
Gompers 2002, Gompers and Lerner 1998). In the financial crisis years 2011 and 2012,
this longstanding fact has changed (Lerner 2013). In Europe, for instance, the deal value
(deal count) of CV activities has risen by 59 percent (15 percent), whereas VC
fundraising has fallen by 5 percent (12.5 percent) in those years. In the most recent years,
both are rising again in terms of deal volumes. However, growth in the CV sector is
stronger (e.g., Pitchbook 2019). The very close link of the past decades appears to be
interrupted by new effects. Given the novelty of this development, there is a research

This study adopts the Bettignies and Chemla’s (2008, p. 505) definition of CV. They “… define corporate
venturing as the financing and development of new business ventures by large established companies,
either inside (intrapreneurship) or outside (corporate venture capital) the corporate structure”.
1
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gap in academic literature on CV. There is no scholarly approach to explain (temporary)
opposing trends in CV investment and VC activity.
This study presents a model analyzing the investment decision of a CV firm. In
order to establish in the market for a new technology, the firm invests and tries to recruit
a star entrepreneur with an innovative idea and skill to implement a new venture. In
addition, there is a VC in the same market for the new technology who wants to recruit
the entrepreneur. The CV investment generates a marginal base return as well as an
additional return from the new venture (venturing return) if successful. The venturing
return depends on entrepreneurial effort, which the firm may elicit by setting incentives
in the contract of the entrepreneur. The model determines the CV firm’s optimal ex-ante
investment considering that there is competition for entrepreneurial talent.
Only a few papers have addressed CV, particularly CV investment, theoretically.
Most closely related, Bettignies and Chemla (2008) present a model on a firm’s choice
of organizational form (corporation vs. CV firm). Similar to this model, the authors
consider a setting where the firm and a rival investor (e.g., a VC) compete for the
recruitment of a star manager with an innovative idea. In the main analysis, they compare
the expected payoffs of the firm for the two options and conclude that firms prefer CV
to organizing as a corporation in order to benefit from superior managerial incentives in
new ventures, and to acquire new knowledge or talent. According to the authors, the
model explains why CV is procyclical to entrepreneurial activity. However, the model
cannot explain the very recent divergence of trends in CV and VC activity. Moreover,
they do not model the investment decision of the firm explicitly but nevertheless predict
that competition for entrepreneurs encourages CV investment. This prediction is to be
taken with care in view of the fact that competition for talent creates pressure on
expected payoffs of investors in the market. It seems quite conceivable that less expected
payoffs translate to reduced investment volumes. In fact, the model developed in this
study will yield an opposite prediction.
This study is further related to Amador and Landier (2003), who consider a
setting in which a manager chooses between contractual offers of a firm and a VC. The
authors argue that the offer of the firm depends on the offer of the VC to the manager.
The better the offer of the VC, the more the firm has to pay. Thus, the VC market exerts
pressure on the firm, which affects the firm’s innovation effort. Anand et al. (2004)
propose a model in which a corporation and a specialist compete for a talented
individual, but focus on the different incentives of the two investors to acquire
entrepreneurial knowledge. Corporations that incorporate the talent into the main line
of business may benefit from the exploitation of synergies, whereas specialists who fund
single projects provide stronger incentives and autonomy. Projects in which talent is
pivotal might better be financed individually by specialists.
The present study contributes to this literature by employing a similar setting,
which is extended by an ex-ante investment decision made by a CV firm. The investment
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provides the firm with an additional tool to elicit the desired effort by the entrepreneur.
Remarkably, the results of the model yield an empirical prediction that is in contrast to
previous theoretical literature, but is consistent with recent empirical observations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Sections 3 (Contracting) and 4 (Investment) contain the main analysis of the paper.
Section 5 concludes the paper. Note that this paper is intended as a thought-provoking
paper in the light of the results of Bettignies and Chemla (2008) and recent empirical
observations, and does not claim to be a comprehensive analysis of the topic of CV
investment.
II.

The Model

The model is in the spirit of Bettignies and Chemla (2008). In the economy, there
are a CV firm2 investing in a new technology, a rival investor (a female VC) who invests
in the same technology3, and a star entrepreneur (male) with an innovative idea. Both the
CV and the VC aim to recruit the entrepreneur to start a new venture with. The discount
rate is normalized to 1. All players are risk-neutral. The timeline of events is illustrated
in Table 1.
Table 1: Timeline
This table provides the timeline of events.

Date

t=0

Investment in the
CV unit

t=1

t=2

t=3

Contracting stage

Entrepreneur
exerts effort

Realization of cash
flows

“CV”, “firm”, and “CV firm” refer to the same player in the model. A neutral gender is assigned to this
player.
3 The model does not endogenize the VC’s investment. This could easily be added, but would in no way
change or enrich the qualitative results of the model.
2
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At date t=0, the firm establishes a CV unit and invests. The investment 𝐼𝑐𝑣 ∈
𝐼2

(0, 1) comes at cost 𝑐𝑣 . This cost can be considered as the cost of raising capital, which
2
is increasing in the amount of capital provided to the CV unit. Alternatively, think of an
effort incurred in monitoring the investment that is also increasing in the volume of the
investment.4 The investment generates a marginal base return Π > 0 from the new
technology.
In addition to the base return, investing in the new technology generates a return
from the new venture (venturing return) 𝜋 > 0 if the entrepreneur exerts effort. In
particular, the venturing return is scaled by entrepreneurial effort 𝑒 ∈ [0, 1] at date t=2
as well as the ex-ante investment, i.e. √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝜋. 5 The term √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒 represents the probability
that the venturing return will be generated. Thus, √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝜋 is the expected venturing
𝑘

return. The cost of effort is given by 2 𝑒 2 . The parameter 𝑘 > 0 represents the marginal
cost of effort. The structure of the expected venturing return captures that both the
investment in the technology and the entrepreneur’s effort are crucial for venture success
but entrepreneurial effort plays a stronger role. The return structure is the same for the
VC (index 𝑣𝑐 instead of 𝑐𝑣). The expected return from the new technology is given by
the base return plus the venturing return if the entrepreneur is recruited by investor 𝑖 ∈
{𝑐𝑣, 𝑣𝑐}:
𝐼𝑖 Π + √𝐼𝑖 𝑒𝑖 𝜋.

(1)

At date t=1, after the investment but before the entrepreneur’s effort, the
entrepreneur pitches his idea to the CV and the VC. Both offer a contract to the
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s compensation 𝑊𝑖 , received from either the CV or the
VC, comprises two components: a fixed base salary 𝑆𝑖 ≥ 0 and a share 𝛽𝑖 ∈ [0, 1] of
the venturing return √𝐼𝑖 𝑒𝑖 𝜋. The non-negativity of parameters 𝑆𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 captures limited
liability. Think of a compensation consisting of a fixed and a variable component. The
latter can be understood as stock options (calls) issued to the entrepreneur in order to
incite his non-contractible effort. In fact, the entrepreneur’s participation 𝛽𝑖∗ in the

The convex nature of the cost function ensures that there will be an interior solution when solving the
model.
4

5

The square root √𝐼𝑐𝑣 serves for mathematical simplification.
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venturing return will determine his effort choice 𝑒𝑖∗ . The superscript “∗” denotes
variables’ equilibrium values.
Moreover, when contracting with the entrepreneur, the firm discloses the capital
provided to the CV unit, as this affects the contract and the entrepreneur’s effort. It is
difficult to imagine an entrepreneur accepting an offer to implement an innovative idea
within a firm without knowing in advance how much capital will be made available for
it. In this respect, the timeline (investment before contracting and effort) seems to make
sense in the light of reality.6 The timeline implies that the entrepreneur’s effort choice
will not only respond to his participation 𝛽𝑖∗ in the venturing return but also to the size
of the investment 𝐼𝑖∗ made by the CV or the VC. Consequently, the CV and the VC have
two ex-ante tools to induce non-verifiable entrepreneurial effort 𝑒𝑖∗ . Note that the model
does not consider the possibility of subsequent adjustments of the investment.
The entrepreneur’s utility 𝑈𝑖 if recruited by 𝑖 is given by his compensation minus
the cost of effort:
𝑘
𝑘
(2)
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑊𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖2 = 𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 √𝐼𝑖 𝑒𝑖 𝜋 − 𝑒𝑖2 .
2
2
III.

Contracting

At date t=1, both the CV and the VC offer a contract to the entrepreneur.
Payoffs are contractible. The contract signed at date t=1 cannot be renegotiated.
However, as is typical in the literature on contracting models in entrepreneurial finance
research, the entrepreneur’s effort is non-verifiable in court and thus non-contractible
(see, e.g., Anand et al. 2004, Bettignies 2008, Bettignies and Chemla 2008, Bettignies and
Duchêne 2015, Casamatta 2003).
The expected aggregate return from investment and recruitment of the
entrepreneur depends on the entrepreneur’s best response in terms of effort at date t=2.
Thus, the contracts offered by the CV and the VC at date t=1 also depend on the
entrepreneur’s best response 𝑒𝑖 (𝐼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 ). Consequently, as the CV and the VC can only
provide imperfect incentives to entrepreneurial effort, the first-best level of effort will
not be achieved, but the second-best level of effort.

In addition, this timeline facilitates the comparability of this model with the most closely related literature,
which makes statements about CV investment before recruiting entrepreneurs.
6
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Given that the CV and the VC compete for the entrepreneur’s talent, the CV’s
(VC’s) offer additionally depends on the VC’s (CV’s) offer, which is expressed in the
entrepreneur’s reservation payoff. As a result, the offers by the CV and the VC are sets
of contracts {𝑆𝑖∗ , 𝛽𝑖∗ , 𝑒𝑖∗ } depending on the entrepreneur’s reservation payoffs 𝑈𝑣𝑐 and
𝑈𝑐𝑣 , respectively. Lemma 1 illustrates the set of contracts offered by the CV to the
entrepreneur. The formal proof of Lemma 1 can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1:
The CV firm offers the following set of contracts to the entrepreneur:
1 √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋
𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋 2
{0, ,
} ∀ 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ∈ [0,
)
2 2𝑘
8𝑘
∗
∗
∗ }
{𝑆𝑐𝑣
, 𝛽𝑐𝑣
, 𝑒𝑐𝑣
= {0,

{

√2𝑈𝑣𝑐 𝑘
√𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋

{𝑈𝑣𝑐 −

,√

2𝑈𝑣𝑐
𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋 2 𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋 2
} ∀ 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ∈ [
,
).
𝑘
8𝑘
2𝑘

(3)

𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋 2
𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋 2
√𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋
, 1,
} ∀ 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ∈ [
, ∞)
2𝑘
𝑘
2𝑘

𝑈𝑣𝑐 represents the reservation payoff of the entrepreneur, which he receives if
recruited by the VC. As explained above, the entrepreneur’s compensation in the CV
firm depends on the VC’s offer, expressed by 𝑈𝑣𝑐 . As formally shown in the Appendix,
there are three relevant areas. If the reservation payoff is relatively small (first area, first
part of expression 3), the entrepreneur is able to extract rents from the venture. The CV,
1
∗
however, can elicit the desired effort by setting 𝛽𝑐𝑣
= 2 and paying no fixed salary. As
the VC’s offer and thus the reservation payoff of the entrepreneur increases, the CV’s
offer remains the same but the entrepreneur’s rent vanishes. If the reservation payoff is
in the second area (second part of expression 3), the CV must increase the entrepreneur’s
share of the venture returns to outbid the VC, which induces higher effort in favor of
the CV firm. If the reservation payoff reaches the third area (third part of expression 3),
the CV must pay a fixed salary in addition to the variable compensation that reaches 100
percent to ensure that the entrepreneur participates. Note that, due to the symmetric
payoff structure from the technology, the VC offers a similar set of contracts (only with
swapped indices 𝑐𝑣 and 𝑣𝑐 in expression 3).
The compensation structure illustrated above is in line with prior research (e.g.,
Amador and Landier 2003, Bettignies and Chemla 2008). The novel feature in this model
is the explicit inclusion of the ex-ante investment. As mentioned above, the investment
is made before contracting, as the entrepreneur’s decision with respect to the selection
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of the investor (CV or VC) and his effort depend on the amount of capital provided.
Therefore, as can also be seen in expression 3, the entrepreneur’s optimal level of effort
𝑒𝑖∗ is determined by the size of the ex-ante investment 𝐼𝑖 . Intuitively, higher investment
– higher capital provision to the entrepreneur’s venture – encourages entrepreneurial
effort. In this respect, the contract structure extends previous research.
Let us turn back to the contracting game. The only interesting scenario in this
study is that the CV recruits the entrepreneur in equilibrium. Therefore, assume that,
compared to the VC, the CV generates an additional benefit 𝜖 from recruiting the
entrepreneur.7 An economic interpretation could be positive synergies or spillovers,
which are typically incurred by large (multi-project) firms but not by (single-project)
specialist investors (Anand et al. 2004, Bettignies and Chemla 2008). The new venture
may generate positive externality on the CV firm’s main business (e.g., the main
production line). As a result of such externality, the CV firm may want to invest and
recruit the entrepreneur for both financial and strategic reasons. In contrast, the VC
rather invests in single-project firms without positive spillovers on her main business.8
In fact, VCs often invest for purely financial objectives whereas corporations usually
pursue both financial and strategic goals (see, e.g., Chesbrough 2002, Covin and Miles
2007, Dushnitsky 2011, Hellmann 2002, Ma 2020, Mathews 2006, Siegel et al. 1988). The
strategic objective of the CV firm provides an additional incentive to recruit the
entrepreneur. Moreover, the positive synergy effect captured by 𝜖 enables the CV firm
to outbid the VC. However, in order to maintain (formal) symmetry between the CV
and the VC in terms of payoff structures and thus contracts, let us assume that the
additional benefit (spillover) is infinitely small, i.e. 𝜖 → 0.9

Alternatively, one could assume that the entrepreneur will prefer the CV’s offer if the offered contracts
are identical.
8 Incidentally, it is questionable whether a VC has any kind of main business in the sense of a production
line at all.
9 Otherwise, if the payoffs of the CV and the VC were truly asymmetric in the sense that the CV firm’s
investment and recruitment of the entrepreneur could generate substantial positive externality, the
investment decisions made at date t=0 would be different across the CV and the VC. Consequently, the
contracts offered at date t=1 would also differ, as would the entrepreneur’s choice of effort. This would
increase the complexity of the contracting stage significantly, as the symmetry assumption facilitates the
solution of the game at date t=1 (see the last part of the Proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix). Note that,
for sake of simplicity, 𝜖 is omitted in all formulae as it is approaching zero.
7
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Lemma 2:
In the subgame equilibrium, the CV recruits the entrepreneur. The expected
payoffs of the CV, VC, and entrepreneur are given by:
2
𝐼𝑐𝑣
∗)
(4)
𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑣
= 𝐼𝑐𝑣 Π −
2
2
𝐼𝑣𝑐
∗)
(5)
𝐸(𝑃𝑣𝑐
= 𝐼𝑣𝑐 Π −
2
𝜋2
(6)
𝑊𝑐𝑣∗ = 𝐼𝑐𝑣 .
2𝑘
The formal proof can be found in the Appendix. This subgame equilibrium can
be explained as follows. The expected recruitment payoff of the CV (VC) is determined
by the expected base return and expected venturing return net of the entrepreneur’s
compensation and investment cost. The no-recruitment payoff is given by the expected
base return minus investment cost. The entrepreneur’s effort and compensation depend
on his respective reservation payoff. From the CV firm’s perspective, the expected
recruitment payoff is greater than the expected no-recruitment payoff if the reservation
payoff 𝑈𝑣𝑐 is sufficiently small. Otherwise, the CV’s expected payoff is negative and the
firm does not recruit the entrepreneur. Therefore, there is a threshold reservation payoff
𝑈𝑣𝑐 to the entrepreneur, such that the expected recruitment payoff equals the expected
no-recruitment payoff. Applying this logic to the VC yields the threshold reservation
payoff 𝑈𝑐𝑣 , at which the VC’s expected recruitment and no-recruitment payoffs are
identical. If both the CV firm and the VC aim to recruit the entrepreneur, they outbid
each other until one of them reaches the threshold payoff 𝑈𝑣𝑐 or 𝑈𝑐𝑣 , respectively.
The CV firm can offer a more attractive contract if 𝑈𝑐𝑣 ≤ 𝑈𝑣𝑐 . In this case, the
CV firm pays the entrepreneur his reservation payoff and recruits him, as the VC cannot
outbid the CV. Otherwise, if 𝑈𝑐𝑣 > 𝑈𝑣𝑐 , the VC recruits the entrepreneur. Given the
symmetric payoff structure of the CV and the VC, they elicit the same effort by the
entrepreneur. Due to the fact that the CV firm incurs a small positive externality from
recruiting the entrepreneur and starting the new venture, the CV can offer a slightly
better contract to the entrepreneur by surrendering the marginal spillover benefit.
Therefore, in the subgame equilibrium, the CV recruits the entrepreneur.
Note that, as illustrated in Lemma 2, the CV firm must actually convey the entire
𝜋2

expected rents from the new venture, i.e. 𝐼𝑐𝑣 2𝑘, to the entrepreneur (plus the positive
externality 𝜖 → 0). Otherwise, the VC would recruit the entrepreneur by offering a more
attractive contract. Therefore, consistent with Bettignies and Chemla (2008),
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competition for the entrepreneur increases the firm’s compensation cost. This, however,
mutes the CV’s investment objective related to the venturing returns. As a result, the
CV’s expected payoff is solely determined by the expected base return.
The assumption of the symmetric return structure between the CV and the rival
investor (VC) is also used by Bettignies and Chemla (2008). This assumption significantly
facilitates the formal analysis (see also Footnote 9 and Proof of Lemma 2 in the
Appendix). In realty, the entrepreneur might face different situations when financed by
the CV compared to the VC. However, technological symmetry does not imply that the
framework conditions (pressure, influence, entrepreneurial freedom, independence,
economic security, etc.) are identical for the entrepreneur, but that they are “equally
good” in aggregate, so that the entrepreneur’s net incentive to exert effort is the same.
More entrepreneurial freedom in the case of VC financing could be accompanied by
greater pressure to succeed. If the entrepreneur implements the venture within the CV
firm, he may have less entrepreneurial freedom or independence, but a better economic
hedge in case the venture fails. This could result in a net incentive symmetry, which is
simplified here by the symmetric payoff structure and thus the symmetric effort level
chosen by the entrepreneur.
IV.

Corporate Venturing Investment

With this preparation, let us turn to the CV’s investment at date t=0. To
∗
determine the optimal investment 𝐼𝑐𝑣
, the CV maximizes its expected payoff considering
the presence of the VC.
Proposition 1:
In an economy with an active VC, the CV firm only considers the marginal base
return from investing. The venturing return does not affect CV investment. The optimal
investment is given by:
∗
(7)
𝐼𝑐𝑣
= Π.
Proof:
The optimal investment is determined by the first order condition

∗ )
𝜕𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑣

𝜕𝐼𝑐𝑣

= 0.

Both the CV and the VC bid for the entrepreneur. Thus, there is competition
for entrepreneurial talent, which enables the entrepreneur to extract the entire rent from
the new venture. As a result, the investment incentive related to the venturing return
disappears in the calculation of the CV. This means, the presence of a VC mutes the
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financial investment incentive from the new venture. The CV therefore invests only for
a weakened financial objective related to the base return and for a strategic objective
related to the entrepreneur’s recruitment.
In order to better understand the impact of competition for entrepreneurial
talent on CV investment, let us see what happens if there were no active VC in the
economy (superscript 𝑛𝑐 means no competition).
Proposition 2:
In an economy with no active VC, the CV firm and the entrepreneur split the
expected venturing return, i.e.:
2
𝜋 2 𝐼𝑐𝑣
𝑛𝑐 )
(8)
𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑣
= 𝐼𝑐𝑣 Π +
−
4𝑘
2
𝜋2
(9)
𝑊𝑐𝑣𝑛𝑐 = 𝐼𝑐𝑣 .
4𝑘
The optimal investment by the CV firm is affected positively by both the
marginal base return and the expected venturing return:
𝜋2
𝑛𝑐
(10)
𝐼𝑐𝑣
= Π+ .
4𝑘
Proof:
The optimal contract can be easily determined by setting 𝑈𝑣𝑐 = 0 in expression
3. The optimal investment is determined by the first order condition

𝑛𝑐 )
𝜕𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑣

𝜕𝐼𝑐𝑣

= 0.

Recall that the presence of the VC reduces the CV firm’s expected profit from
the new venture, as the CV and the VC compete for the entrepreneur. Competitive
pressure results in higher compensation cost for the CV firm, which eventually translates
into lower expected payoffs. Put differently, without competition for the entrepreneur,
the CV firm can realize some (half) of the expected venturing return. This encourages
investment. This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1:
The presence of a VC decreases CV investment, i.e.:
𝜋2
∗
𝑛𝑐
𝐼𝑐𝑣
− 𝐼𝑐𝑣
=− .
4𝑘

(11)
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Proof:
𝑛𝑐
∗
The proof is straightforward from subtracting 𝐼𝑐𝑣
from 𝐼𝑐𝑣
.
Lower expected payoffs weaken (mute) the financial incentive to invest related
to the venturing return. What remains is the financial incentive from the expected base
return and, in addition, the strategic incentive to recruit the entrepreneur and to invest.
In a sense, this result contradicts Bettignies and Chemla’s (2008) argument that
competition for talent encourages CV investment. In particular, their model predicts that
competition for entrepreneurs resulting from activity of rival investors, such as VCs,
encourages CV investment (see Prediction 2 on p. 518 in their study: “Stronger
competition for talent should increase corporate venturing investment.”). In contrast,
the present model predicts that stronger competition for entrepreneurial talent should
decrease CV investment.
This is a novel finding that extends previous research. It suggests that
competition for talent may be the reason for the decoupling of trends in CV investment
and VC activity, which has recently been observed empirically. The rationale can be
summarized as follows: Competition for talent puts entrepreneurs in a better position
when negotiating with investors, such as CV firms and VCs. Entrepreneurs must be
offered higher compensation in order to recruit them successfully. If competition is
fierce, entrepreneurs can extract the entire rent from the new ventures. In view of the
fact that no profits can be made from engaging in new ventures, investors’ incentive to
invest in such constellations is reduced. Consequently, less is invested.
V.

Concluding Remarks

During most of history, CV activity has been procyclical to VC activity. There
have been booms in VC investments entailing booms in CV investments in the late
1960s, mid-1980s, and late 1990s. In the financial crisis years 2011 and 2012, this has
changed. In fact, in those years, CV activity was still on the rise, whereas VC activity was
on the decline. In the most recent years, both are rising again in terms of volume.
However, growth in the CV sector is stronger. Motivated by this empirical observation,
this study developed a model, which may explain the recent divergence or decoupling of
trends in CV investment and VC activity.
Consistent with previous research, the model demonstrates that VCs create
competition for entrepreneurs, which eventually increases CV firms’ cost related to the
recruitment of entrepreneurial talent (compensation cost). As a result, CV firms’
expected payoffs from venturing with newly recruited entrepreneurs decrease or may
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vanish totally, as competition for talent enables entrepreneurs to extract higher rents
from the ventures. This reduces the profitability of CV investment and thus weakens
financial objectives to invest. However, CV firms might still have strategic investment
incentives. Competition from VCs for entrepreneurial talent may be one factor that
explains the recently observed decoupling of trends in CV investment and VC activity.
Certainly, there are several coupling factors or effects, such as complementarity
or spillovers among investments and R&D efforts, general sentiment in the market, or
simply the entrepreneurial climate within the economy, which may at times outweigh the
negative effect of competition for talent on CV investment. Additionally, VCs may also
pursue strategic goals. This provides avenues for further theoretical research.
Nevertheless, as suggested by this model, the encouraging effect of less competition for
entrepreneurial talent from VCs on CV investment may be one major reason for the
recent phenomenon that CV investment rises while VC activity is on the decline.
The testable prediction derived from this model (Stronger competition for
entrepreneurial talent should decrease CV investment.) contradicts the prediction made by
Bettignies and Chemla (2008), and points to directions for future empirical research on
CV investment and, in addition, on what may decouple the trends in CV and VC activity.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1:
The CV aims to maximize its net expected payoff from recruiting the entrepreneur:
2
𝐼𝑐𝑣
(12)
max 𝐼𝑐𝑣 Π + √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝑐𝑣 𝜋 − (𝑆𝑐𝑣 + 𝛽𝑐𝑣 √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝑐𝑣 𝜋) − .
𝑒𝑐𝑣
2
The entrepreneur chooses effort level to maximize his expected utility:
𝑘 2
𝑒𝑐𝑣 ∈ arg max 𝑆𝑐𝑣 + 𝛽𝑐𝑣 √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝑐𝑣 𝜋 − 𝑒𝑐𝑣
,
2

(13)

subject to:
𝑘 2
𝑆𝑐𝑣 + 𝛽𝑐𝑣 √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝑐𝑣 𝜋 − 𝑒𝑐𝑣
≥ 𝑈𝑣𝑐 .
2

(14)

The entrepreneur’s optimal effort level is given by:
𝛽𝑐𝑣 √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋
𝑘
𝑘𝑒𝑐𝑣
⟺ 𝛽𝑐𝑣 =
.
√𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋
𝑒𝑐𝑣 =

Substituting this into the CV’s objective function yields:

(15)
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2 )
max 𝐼𝑐𝑣 Π + √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝑐𝑣 𝜋 − (𝑆𝑐𝑣 + 𝑘𝑒𝑐𝑣
𝑒

∗
𝑒𝑐𝑣
=

(16)

√𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋
.
2𝑘
𝐼 𝜋2

1

𝐼 𝜋2

∗
∗
Hence, 𝛽𝑐𝑣
= 2 and 𝑆𝑐𝑣
= 0 if 𝑈𝑣𝑐 < 𝑐𝑣8𝑘 . If, however, 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ≥ 𝑐𝑣8𝑘 , condition 14 is
∗
∗
violated. The CV increases 𝛽𝑐𝑣
, thus 𝑒𝑐𝑣
, such that the condition is satisfied again:
𝑘 2
𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋 2
(17)
𝑆𝑐𝑣 + 𝛽𝑐𝑣 √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝑐𝑣 𝜋 − 𝑒𝑐𝑣 ≥
,
2
8𝑘

2𝑈𝑣𝑐

∗
if 𝑒𝑐𝑣
=√

𝑘

∗
, 𝛽𝑐𝑣
=

√2𝑈𝑣𝑐 𝑘
√𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋

∗
, and 𝑆𝑐𝑣
= 0. If 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ≥

𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋 2
2𝑘

, the firm can no longer ensure

∗
that condition 14 is satisfied through the incentive parameter, because increasing 𝛽𝑐𝑣

along with 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ≥

𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋 2
2𝑘

would induce an inefficiently high effort by the entrepreneur.
𝐼 𝜋2

∗
Instead, the firm pays a fixed salary 𝑆𝑐𝑣
= 𝑈𝑣𝑐 − 𝑐𝑣2𝑘 , which ensures that the condition
∗
is satisfied again. The variable compensation reaches its maximum possible value 𝛽𝑐𝑣
=
∗
1. This elicits the first-best effort 𝑒𝑐𝑣
=

√𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝜋
𝑘

.

The contract offered by the VC is similar (only with swapped indices 𝑣𝑐 and 𝑐𝑣) due to
the symmetric return structure.
QED
Proof of Lemma 2:
The expected recruitment payoff of the CV is given by:
𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑣 ) = 𝐼𝑐𝑣 Π + √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝑐𝑣 𝜋 − 𝑊𝑐𝑣 −

2
𝐼𝑐𝑣
.
2

If the CV does not recruit the entrepreneur, its expected payoff is 𝐼𝑐𝑣 Π −
for the VC, we have the following recruitment payoff:
2
𝐼𝑣𝑐
𝐸(𝑃𝑣𝑐 ) = 𝐼𝑣𝑐 Π𝑣𝑐 + √𝐼𝑣𝑐 𝑒𝑣𝑐 𝜋 − 𝑊𝑣𝑐 − .
2

(18)
2
𝐼𝑐𝑣

2

. Similarly,
(19)
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𝐼2

If she does not recruit the entrepreneur, her expected payoff is 𝐼𝑣𝑐 Π𝑣𝑐 − 𝑣𝑐
. Note that
2
the entrepreneur’s effort 𝑒𝑖 and the compensation 𝑊𝑖 depend on his reservation payoff.
From the firm’s perspective, the expected recruitment payoff is greater than the norecruitment payoff if the reservation payoff 𝑈𝑣𝑐 is sufficiently small, i.e. 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ≤ 𝑈𝑣𝑐 . The
weak inequality captures that the entrepreneur would choose the firm if indifferent. If,
however, 𝑈𝑣𝑐 > 𝑈𝑣𝑐 , the firm’s expected payoff is negative and the firm does not recruit
the entrepreneur. Therefore, there is a reservation payoff to the entrepreneur 𝑈𝑣𝑐 , such
that the recruitment payoff equals the no-recruitment payoff. Replacing 𝑊𝑖 yields the
following equation, which implicitly determines 𝑈𝑣𝑐 :
2
𝑘 2
𝐼𝑐𝑣
𝐼2
(20)
̂ + √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝑐𝑣 (𝑈𝑣𝑐 )𝜋 − 𝑈𝑣𝑐 − 𝑒𝑐𝑣
̂ 𝑐𝑣 − 𝑐𝑣 .
𝐼𝑐𝑣 Π
(𝑈𝑣𝑐 ) −
= 𝐼𝑐𝑣 Π
2
2
2
For the VC, the recruitment payoff equals the no-recruitment payoff if 𝑈𝑐𝑣 = 𝑈𝑐𝑣 . If
𝑈𝑐𝑣 < 𝑈𝑐𝑣 , the VC recruits the entrepreneur. Otherwise, the VC does not recruit the
entrepreneur. If both the CV firm and the VC bid for the entrepreneur, the CV firm can
offer a more attractive contract if 𝑈𝑐𝑣 ≤ 𝑈𝑣𝑐 . In this case, the CV firm offers contract
𝑊𝑐𝑣 = 𝑈𝑐𝑣 and recruits the entrepreneur, as the VC cannot outbid the CV. Then, the
firm’s expected payoff is given by:
2
𝑘 2
𝐼𝑐𝑣
(21)
𝐸 (𝑃𝑐𝑣 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 )) = 𝐼𝑐𝑣 Π𝑐𝑣 + √𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝑐𝑣 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 )𝜋 − 𝑈𝑐𝑣 − 𝑒𝑐𝑣 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 ) − .
2
2
The payoff of the entrepreneur is 𝑊𝑐𝑣 = 𝑈𝑐𝑣 , and the VC expects to receive the norecruitment payoff. If, however, 𝑈𝑐𝑣 > 𝑈𝑣𝑐 , the VC offers 𝑊𝑣𝑐 = 𝑈𝑣𝑐 and recruits the
entrepreneur. The VC’s payoff is:
2
𝑘 2
𝐼𝑣𝑐
(22)
𝐸 (𝑃𝑣𝑐 (𝑈𝑣𝑐 )) = 𝐼𝑣𝑐 Π𝑣𝑐 + √𝐼𝑣𝑐 𝑒𝑣𝑐 (𝑈𝑣𝑐 )𝜋 − 𝑈𝑣𝑐 − 𝑒𝑣𝑐
(𝑈𝑣𝑐 ) − .
2
2
The entrepreneur gets 𝑊𝑣𝑐 = 𝑈𝑣𝑐 , and the firm expects to receive the no-recruitment
payoff. Note that, by definition of 𝑈𝑐𝑣 :
2
𝑘 2
𝐼𝑣𝑐
𝐸 (𝑃𝑣𝑐 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 )) = 𝐼𝑣𝑐 Π𝑣𝑐 + √𝐼𝑣𝑐 𝑒𝑣𝑐 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 )𝜋 − 𝑈𝑐𝑣 − 𝑒𝑣𝑐
(𝑈𝑐𝑣 ) −
2
2
(23)
2
𝐼𝑣𝑐
̂ 𝑣𝑐 − .
= 𝐼𝑣𝑐 Π
2
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Hence,
𝑘

𝑈𝑐𝑣 = √𝐼𝑣𝑐 𝑒𝑣𝑐 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 )𝜋 − 𝑒2𝑣𝑐 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 ).
2

(24)

We can substitute this into the CV’s expected payoff and obtain:
∗
∗
∗
𝐸 (𝑃𝑐𝑣
(𝑈𝑐𝑣 )) = 𝐼𝑐𝑣 Π𝑐𝑣 + 𝜋 (√𝐼𝑐𝑣 𝑒𝑐𝑣
(𝑈𝑐𝑣 ) − √𝐼𝑣𝑐 𝑒𝑣𝑐
(𝑈𝑐𝑣 ))
2
𝑘
𝐼𝑐𝑣
− (𝑒 ∗ 2𝑐𝑣 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 ) − 𝑒 ∗ 2𝑣𝑐 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 )) − .
2
2

(25)

Given the symmetric payoff structure, the CV and the VC elicit the same effort by the
entrepreneur. Thus,
𝑘
𝑘 2
(26)
𝑈𝑐𝑣 = √𝐼𝑣𝑐 𝑒𝑣𝑐 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 )𝜋 − 𝑒2𝑣𝑐 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 ) = √𝐼𝑣𝑐 𝑒𝑣𝑐 (𝑈𝑐𝑣 )𝜋 − 𝑒𝑣𝑐
(𝑈𝑐𝑣 ).
2
2
Given the assumptions in the text, the CV recruits the entrepreneur in equilibrium. This
yields the expected payoffs given in Lemma 2 in the text.
QED

